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Catastrophic Shocks and Capital Markets: A Comparative 
Analysis by Disaster and Sector 
Abstract 
This paper provides an analysis of the impact of natural, industrial and terrorist disasters on 
the Australian capital market using the Box and Tiao intervention analysis and the data on 
daily returns in the following ten market sectors: consumer discretionary, consumer staples, 
energy, financial, health care, industrial, information technology, materials, 
telecommunication services and utilities. Inter alia, we have found that the shocks provided 
by natural disasters have an influence on market sector returns, depending upon the sector in 
question. The sectors most sensitive to disasters of any type are the consumer discretionary, 
financial services and materials sectors while the most significant single event during the past 
eight years would appear to be the September 11 terrorist attack, at least in terms of its impact 
upon the capital market. 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent events have renewed interest in the financial impact of disasters and catastrophes. 
Most notably, the September 11 terrorist attacks on the New York World Trade Centre 
showed how catastrophic events such as this adversely affect both domestic and international 
capital markets through the creation of uncertainty and panic, the promotion of extreme price 
volatility and the partial destruction of global financial centres (Chen and Siems 2002). But 
while disasters and catastrophes of a human origin such as terrorist acts have dominated 
public awareness of late, natural disasters and catastrophes (including floods, storms, 
bushfires, hurricanes, cyclones, tsunamis and earthquakes) continue to cause severe and 
increasing damage to global economies and disruption to international financial activity 
(FEMA 2003, EMA 2003). Similarly, industrial disasters and catastrophes of unintended 
human origin have shown themselves just as capable of seriously disrupting financial 
systems. Through the disruption of production and consumption, the interruption of domestic 
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and international trade, the destruction of infrastructure, buildings and vehicles, and the 
creation of uncertainty in the minds of investors, producers and consumers alike, disasters and 
catastrophes, whether of human or natural origin, have the clear and demonstrated potential to 
adversely affect financial activity and wellbeing.   For example Fairbairn (1998) examines the 
devastating effects of natural disasters on social and economic infrastructure and the 
productive base in a number of Pacific island countries. He proposes a number of measures 
which can be implemented to mitigate economic losses. More recently the effects of natural 
disasters are of growing interest to East Asian Economies particularly after the December 
2004 tsunami which was among the deadliest disasters in modern history, killing well over 
240,000 people. Although this paper does not make an attempt to model the effects of natural 
disasters on financial markets in East Asian countries, the adopted Box and Tiao intervention 
technique in this paper can provide a useful analytical framework for this purpose. 
In response to these concerns, an emergent literature has arisen to examine the 
financial impact of natural events, disasters and catastrophes on capital markets. But to date, 
most of this research has focused more narrowly on the property-liability insurance industry 
[see, for example, Shelor et al. (1992), Aiuppa et al. (1993), Lamb (1995), Angbazo and 
Narayanan (1996) and Cagle (1996)] . Within this industry, two opposing, but not mutually 
exclusive, hypotheses exist. The first and most obvious is that insurers, because of the 
payments made to policyholders for their damages, incur large losses. While at least some of 
this is offset by reinsurance, for the most part the expectation is that these losses should cause 
insurance stocks to decline at the time of the disaster. The less obvious effect is that insurers 
benefit from an isolated catastrophic event because of increased demand for their products, 
through an increase in both required coverage and additional premium earnings.  
The net effect on property-liability insurer stock values thus varies according to the 
relative strength of these two opposing forces. Shelor et al. (1992) and Aiuppa et al. (1993), 
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for example, both concluded that insurer stock values increased after California’s Loma Prieta 
earthquake [insured loss USD2.5 billion] in part because high earthquake insurance rates and 
low perceived risk meant many property owners were uncovered at the time. Conversely, 
Angbazo and Narayanan (1996) and Lamb (1995) found that the large negative effect of 
Florida and Louisiana’s Hurricane Andrew [insured loss USD16.5 billion] was only slightly 
offset by the subsequent premium increases, and furthermore that the event even showed 
evidence of a contagion effect to insurers with no claims exposure in the hurricane affected 
states. Cagle (1996) concluded that South Carolina’s Hurricane Hugo [insured loss USD4.2 
billion] caused a significant negative price reaction for insurers with high exposure and 
unaffected those with low exposure. Lastly at an aggregate level Worthington and Valadkhani 
(2004) have recently examined the impact and duration of natural disaster effects on the 
Australian equity market. The present study is in fact an extension of the work by 
Worthington and Valadkhani (2004) in that it quantifies such effects on the daily returns 
within various sectors in Australia’s capital markets. 
It is clear that existing research into the financial impact of disasters and catastrophes 
suffers a number of limitations. First and foremost, there is the concentration on the property 
liability insurance industry, even though it is well known that disasters and catastrophes have 
a substantial impact on non-insurance industries and sectors (BTE 2001, FMA 2003, EMA 
2003). For example, industries and sectors heavily dependent on consumer confidence or 
those reliant on international trade may be dealt a heavy blow through acts of terrorism, while 
those in natural disaster-affected areas may experience disruption to production and 
distribution through the destruction of essential infrastructure, buildings and vehicles.  
Second, nearly all past studies of the financial impact of disasters and catastrophes have 
tended to concentrate on natural events [see, for instance, Miller (1991), Shelor et al. (1992), 
Lamb (1995) and West (2003)]. While this is a logical outcome of the aforementioned focus 
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on property-liability insurers and insurable losses, it ignores the increasingly alarming 
frequency of intended human acts such as terrorism and unintended human events such as 
industrial accidents and corporate collapses that likewise have the potential to bring about 
catastrophic financial shocks. Third, there has been the tendency to concentrate on single 
events [see, for example, Shelor et al. (1992), Aiuppa et al. (1993) and Cagle (1996)]. While 
this simplifies the analysis, single events may be susceptible to contamination to 
macroeconomic events independent of the disaster or catastrophe itself (West 2003). 
Moreover, valuable lessons are likely to be learned regarding the different impacts of disasters 
and catastrophes when several events are compared within a single study.  
Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to model the market sector impacts of 
catastrophes in Australia. Apart from the work by Worthington and Valadkhani (2004), the 
current study is believed to be the first financial study of disasters and catastrophes to use 
intervention analysis in an autoregressive moving average (ARMA) framework, and one of 
few studies of the financial impacts of disasters and catastrophes outside the United States. 
The paper itself is divided into four main areas. The second section explains the data 
employed in the analysis and presents some summary statistics. The third section discusses 
the methodology employed. The results are dealt with in the fourth section. The paper ends 
with some brief concluding remarks. 
2. Data and Summary Statistics 
Two sets of data are employed in the analysis. The first set is the daily closing prices for the 
ten Australian equity sector indices calculated by Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI): namely, consumer discretionary (CND), consumer staples (CNS), energy (ENG), 
financial (FIN), health care (HLT), industrial (IND), information technology (INF), materials 
(MTL), telecommunication services (TEL) and utilities (UTL). The sample period for all 
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indices ends on 2 July 2003 with CND, CNS, ENG, FIN, HLT, IND and MTL commencing on 
2 January 1995 (2,216 observations), UTL on 3 June 1996 (1,846 observations), TEL on 28 
November 1996 (1,457 observations) and INF on 31 May 2000 (804 observations).  All data 
is obtained electronically from Bloomberg. The natural log of the relative price is computed 
for the closing prices to produce a time series of continuously compounded daily returns, such 
that rt = log(pt/pt-1)x100, where pt and pt-1 represent the market price at time t and t-1, 
respectively. 
<TABLE 1 HERE> 
The second set of data comprises the most significant disasters affecting the Australian 
market during the period 2 January 1995 to 2 July 2003. While some of Australia’s most 
devastating disasters are not included in this period, including Cyclone Tracey in 1974, the 
1983 Ash Wednesday bushfires, and the 1989 Newcastle earthquake, it comprises the longest 
period where consistent daily price indices were available for most Australian equity sectors. 
Three categories of events are included: namely, natural disasters, industrial disasters and 
terrorist disasters, with events included on the basis that they provide potentially significant 
business impacts, primarily on the basis of sizeable insured and uninsured losses.   
Two events are included in the category of ‘natural disasters’. The first natural disaster 
is a severe hailstorm that struck southern Sydney on 14 April 1999.  This hailstorm is now 
recognised by the Insurance Council of Australia as representing the largest insured loss for a 
single natural event in Australian history causing substantial damage (number of 
claims/estimated cost in brackets) to homes (43,000/$300 million), motor vehicles 
(32,000/$309 million), commercial buildings (3,000/$220 million) and aircraft (numbers not 
recorded/$109 million) in the Sydney region. It is accepted that total damages now surpass 
that caused by the Newcastle earthquake in December 1989 ($1.124 billion in 1998 dollars) 
CATASTROPHIC SHOCKS AND CAPITAL MARKETS 
 
7
after the remaining anticipated costs such as business interruption are included. The second 
natural disaster recorded is bushfires that burned in NSW, the ACT, Victoria, Tasmania and 
Western Australia almost continuously from early October 2002 through to February 2003, 
culminating in a devastating blaze in Canberra on 18 January 2003. The Canberra fires, which 
are the country’s second largest bushfire since Victoria’s 1983 Ash Wednesday and 8th worst 
natural disaster since 1967, left four people dead, scores injured, nearly 500 homes destroyed 
and hundreds more severely damaged, and total costs currently estimated at $312 million. 
Two events are also included in the category of ‘industrial disasters’. The first of these 
is the Victorian gas supply crisis that started on 25 September 1998 following an explosion 
and fire at Esso’s Longford natural gas processing plant which killed two workers and cut the 
state's gas supply for about two weeks. The Royal Commission into the explosion found that 
Esso's failings on workplace safety and employee training contributed solely to the explosion 
which ripped through the natural gas processing plant in Victoria's south-east, while for two 
weeks after the blast Victorian businesses and households struggled to operate without gas in 
a crisis which was estimated to cost gas users nearly $1.3 billion. The second industrial 
disaster occurred on 15 March 2001 when the major companies in the HIH Insurance group, 
Australia’s second-largest general (non-life) insurer, were placed in provisional liquidation 
with unfunded liabilities of $5 billion. Along with far-reaching implications for corporate 
governance and financial supervision of Australia’s largest financial and non-financial firms 
flowing from a Royal Commission, the collapse of HIH is recognised as the largest corporate 
failure to date and played an important role in worsening Australia’s public liability and 
professional indemnity insurance crisis. 
The final category comprises two ‘terrorist disasters’. The first is the attack on New 
York’s World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, which apart from killing 2,801 people 
caused significant and ongoing disruption to global business with profound implications for 
 8
international economic, political and social stability into the foreseeable future. The second 
event occurred on 12 October 2002 when more than 200 people died, 88 of them Australians, 
when two bombs ripped through the Sari Club and Paddy's Bar in the tourist strip along Kuta 
Beach in Bali, Indonesia. While the direct economic and financial impacts of these two 
particular events are difficult to ascertain, it is recognised that they are both watersheds in 
Australian political, social and economic life. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the daily returns in each of the ten equity 
sectors. Sample means, medians, maximum and minimums, standard deviations, skewness, 
kurtosis and the Jacque-Bera statistic and p-value are reported. The lowest mean returns are in 
the information technology (0.0001) and materials (0.0001) sectors and the highest mean 
returns are for financial services (0.0004) and utilities (0.0004). The lowest minimum returns 
are in the information technology (-0.3339) and consumer discretionary (-0.1306) sectors, as 
are the highest maximum returns (2.5246 and 0.2002, respectively). The standard deviations 
of returns range from 0.0095 (financial services) to 0.0986 (information technology). On this 
basis, of the ten sectors the returns in the information technology, consumer durables and 
telecommunications sectors are the most volatile, with financial services, consumer staples 
and industrials being the least volatile. 
By and large, the distributional properties of the daily returns appear non-normal. 
Returns in consumer durables (CND), heath care (HLT) and information technology (INF) are 
significantly positively skewed (0.3981, 0.7183 and 20.8943, respectively), indicating the 
greater probability of large increases in returns than decreases (that is, volatility clustering in 
daily returns). Conversely, returns in the financial services (FIN) and industrials (IND) sectors 
are significantly negatively skewed (-0.3369 and -0.3409). The kurtosis, or degree of excess, 
in all return series is also significantly large and greater than three, ranging from 4.5074 in 
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materials (MTL) to 537.3205 in information technology (INF), thereby indicating leptokurtic 
distributions.  
The Jarque-Bera statistics and corresponding p-values in Table 1 are used to test the 
null hypotheses that the daily distribution of sector returns is normally distributed. All ten p-
values are smaller than the .01 level of significance suggesting the null hypothesis can be 
rejected. These stock market returns are then not well approximated by the normal 
distribution. Unit root tests are conducted in Table 1 as a means of elaborating upon the time 
series properties of the return series and ensuring stationarity for the ARMA specification to 
follow. The ADF t-statistics reject the null hypotheses of a unit root at the .01 level assuming 
both constant only and constant and trend in all return series.  For the KPSS tests of the null 
hypothesis of no unit root with constant only, For the KPSS tests of the null hypothesis of no 
unit root with constant only, the LM-statistic fails to exceed the asymptotic critical value at 
the .10 level for all series. We may conclude that the return series examined are stationary. 
3. Model Specification 
Since the time series data on sectoral returns are available in regularly spaced intervals and 
given the timing of the natural, industrial and terrorist disasters is known with certainty, 
intervention analysis can be used to examine the impact of disasters on the Australian capital 
market. Intervention analysis is based on the Box-Jenkins methodology in which an 
autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model is augmented by dummy variables to evaluate 
the effect(s) of extraordinary or abnormal events. Since first proposed by Box and Tiao (1975) 
this technique has been employed in a variety of financial contexts. For example, Ho and Wan 
(2002) used intervention analysis to test for structural breaks following the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, Liu and Yu (2002) investigated the role of Taiwan’s stock stabilization fund 
in countering market declines associated with foreign policy changes and Bhar (2001) and St. 
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Pierre (1998) used it to examine the return and volatility dynamics of the Australian spot and 
futures markets and the volatility impacts of introducing option contracts, respectively. 
Likewise, intervention analysis has already found application in studies of natural disasters, 
including Fox’s (1995, 1996) analysis of the impact of Hurricane Hugo on business 
environments.        
The following ARMA process of order (k,q) is specified (assuming stationary daily 
returns): 
( )(1 ) ( )rk t q tL L y L tDφ μ εΦ − = +Θ + β       (1) 
where Φk(L) represents a k-order polynomial lag operator, φ is a seasonal parameter, r is the 
seasonal lag term, y represents the market return in price defined as log(pt/pt-1), μ is a 
constant, Θq(L) denotes a q-order polynomial lag operator, ε is a white noise process, k is the 
number of autoregressive (AR) terms, q is the number of moving-average (MA) terms and Dt 
are intervention dummy variables.  
Three important specification issues arise in this model. First, as part of the modeling 
process one needs first to choose accurate values for k, r and q in the ARMA specification. 
While the identification of an appropriate ARMA model is not exact, as a rule of thumb the 
Akaike information (AIC) and Schwartz specification (SC) and the autocorrelation (AC) and 
partial autocorrelation (PAC) functions can be used to determine q and k, respectively.  The 
estimated model is then subjected to a range of diagnostic checks on the residuals to ensure 
that the model has properly accounted for all systematic variation in the time series. Second, 
the ARMA model specified should also capture any systematic underlying time series 
patterns, if any, in the data (of which seasonality is potentially the most obvious). This is 
important since systematic time series patterns in the fluctuations in the data need to be 
accounted for so as to accurately gauge the impact of the disasters. In order to address this 
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possibility, equation (1) is augmented by a seasonal autoregressive term (Box et al. 1994). 
Lastly, it is also important under ARMA theory that the series being modeled is stationary. As 
shown in Table 1 unit root tests for the return series indicate stationarity. The general form of 
the equation used to model sector returns is then as follows:  
 621 2 0 1(1 ... )(1 ) ( )
nk r
k t q t ij itj
L L L L y L D wρ ρ ρ φ μ ε β= −=− − − − = +Θ + +j t∑   (2) 
where ρs are autoregressive parameters, i denotes the i-th catastrophic event (1 = Sydney hail 
storm, 2 = Canberra bush fire, 3 = Victorian gas supply crisis, 4 = HIH collapse, 5 = 
September 11, 6 = Bali bombing) and all other variables are as previously defined.  In order to 
measure the impact of the i-th event on the dependent variable, we have considered the 
following scenarios: (i) each dummy variable takes on the value of one on the first day of the 
event declining linearly at the rate of 0.10 per day until it reaches zero after ten days and zero 
otherwise, (ii) each dummy variable is equal to 0.10 on the first day of the event increasing 
linearly at the rate of 0.10 per day until it reaches unity after ten days, and zero otherwise, (iii) 
each dummy variable takes on the value of unity on the day and the day after the first day of 
the event and otherwise zero, (iv) each dummy variable takes on the value of unity on the day 
of the event and otherwise zero. Among these, scenario (i) produced the most statistically 
appropriate results for all events and sectors on the basis of various model specification 
criteria, supporting the view that the impact of each event declines through time.     
The magnitude and sign of the estimated coefficients on these six dummy variables 
indicates the mean effect of each disaster category on market sector return beyond what could 
have been expected from the discernible systematic pattern of data fluctuations in the ARMA 
model. The sign on the estimated coefficients will, of course, depend on the net impact of 
each type of natural disaster upon each sector. No particular sign on the estimated coefficients 
is then hypothesized.   
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However, there is the real possibility that the effects of these catastrophic events may 
persist beyond the day of the event itself. Persistence in this model may be related to difficulty 
in ascertaining the likely losses associated with the natural disaster, lags in information 
dissemination from the disaster area or delays in forecasting the possible financial effects for 
firm, industries, sectors and the market as a whole. Currently, these effects are assumed to 
persist up to ten working days with the maximum and minimum effect occurring on the first 
and tenth days, respectively. Given the assumed mean reverting process in the Australian 
market returns, it is plausible to hypothesize that the effects will be all or nearly all exhausted 
during this period.  
4. Empirical Results 
The estimated coefficients, standard errors and p-values of the parameters for the ARMA 
regression models are provided in Table 2. The dependent variables are the respective daily 
returns in the Australian consumer discretionary (CND), consumer staples (CNS), energy 
(ENG), financial (FIN), health care (HLT), industrial (IND), information technology (INF), 
materials (MTL), telecommunication services (TEL) and utilities (UTL) sectors. Also included 
in Table 2 are statistics for the Akaike information (AIC) and Schwartz specification (SC) 
criterion as guides for model specification, the likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic as a test of 
model significance and the Durbin-Watson (DW) Ljung-Box (Q) and Breusch-Godfrey 
Lagrange multiplier (LM) test statistics for first and higher-order serial correlation in the 
residuals. White’s heteroskedasticity test is used to test the null hypothesis of no 
heteroskedasticity against heteroskedasticity of some unknown form. Where the null 
hypothesis fails to be rejected (ENG, HLT, IND, INF and UTL) conventional standard errors 
are presented in Table 2, whereas if the test is rejected (CND, CNS, FIN, MTL and TEL) 
White’s heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are used.  
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<TABLE 2 HERE> 
The results in these models appear sensible in terms of both the precision of the 
estimates and the signs on the coefficients. Different optimal ARMA(p,q) error processes are 
found to generate statistically acceptable models in each of the ten sectors. For example, in 
the model where CND is specified as the dependent variable a ARMA(4,4) error process is 
selected: that is, an autoregressive and moving average error process based on 1-4 day lagged 
residuals sufficiently accounts for the systematic variation in returns. Alternatively, a 
ARMA(1,1) model well fits the models where INF and UTL are specified as the dependent 
variables. Seasonal autoregressive terms are also tested for inclusion in the final specification 
for each sector, with seasonal parameters (number of lags in brackets) included where CNS 
(9), ENG (5), FIN (4), HLT (4) and MTL (10) are specified as dependent variables. Likelihood 
ratio (LR) tests of the null hypothesis that all parameters are jointly zero are rejected at the .10 
level or higher for all final specifications with the exception of INF.  
The ARMA intervention models also pass the conventional diagnostic tests. The 
Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic, especially considering the absence of lagged dependent 
variables in the regression model, is strongly suggestive of no first-order serial correlation. 
Moreover, the Ljung-Box Q-statistics (up to 36 lags) and the Breusch-Godfrey LM-statistics 
(5 lags) fail to reject the null hypotheses of no higher-order serial correlation and the 
autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations of the innovations in the ARMA models (not 
shown) are all nearly zero with insignificant Q-statistics and large p-values. All estimated 
coefficients for the seasonal φ, autoregressive ρ and moving average θ terms are also 
statistically significant and the inverted AR and MA roots (not shown) have modulus less than 
one, indicating that the estimated ARMA models are stationary. Combined together, these 
tests indicate that no important forecasting power has been overlooked. Nonetheless, the 
scale-invariant forecasting accuracy varies markedly across the different sectors, with the 
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ARMA models used being most accurate (Thiel inequality coefficient in brackets) in 
forecasting returns in the consumer staples (0.0649) and materials (0.0830) sectors and least 
accurate in the information technology (0.4387) and health care (0.2366) sectors.    
Consider the results for the financial services (FIN) sector. In this model, the estimated 
coefficients for the Victorian gas supply crisis, the HIH collapse and the September 11 
terrorist attack are negative and significant at the 5 percent level of significance or lower. The 
market effect with the largest economic impact is for September 11 (-0.0237), followed by the 
gas supply crisis (-0.0162) and then the collapse of HIH (-0.0105). The estimated coefficients 
for the Sydney hail storm, the Canberra bushfires and the Bali bombing are not significant at 
any conventional level. Alternatively, in the materials (MTL) sector the estimated coefficients 
for the Sydney hail storm and the Canberra bushfires are significant (along with September 
11) at the 10 percent level of significance or higher, with negative market effects from the 
latter two (-0.0070 and -0.0184, respectively) and a positive effect from the former (0.0232). 
Put differently, September 11 and the Canberra bushfires were associated with a 1.84 and 0.70 
percent decline in the materials sector in the ten days following the event, while the Sydney 
hailstorm produced a positive market effect in the materials sector with an increase of 2.32 
percent over the ensuing period. None of the estimated disasters coefficients are individually 
significant in the models where the returns for consumer staples, energy, healthy care, 
information technology, telecommunications and utilities are specified as the dependent 
variable.  
Wald tests of the joint insignificance of the coefficients for each disaster category are 
also conducted and the results presented in Table 3. As shown, the null hypotheses of the joint 
insignificance of the invention variables for natural, industrial, terrorist and all disasters fail to 
be rejected for the consumer staples (CNS), energy (ENG), health care (HLT), industrial 
(IND), telecommunications (TEL) and utilities (UTL) sectors. The null hypothesis of joint 
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insignificance is rejected for terrorist and all disasters in the consumer discretionary (CND) 
sector, for industrial, terrorist and all disasters in the financial (FIN) sector, for natural and 
industrial disasters in the information technology (INF) sector, and for natural, terrorist and all 
disasters in the materials (MTL) sector. We may conclude that the impact of natural disasters 
on market returns is largely restricted to the materials and information technology sectors, 
industrial disasters to the financial services and information technology sectors, terrorist 
disasters to the consumer discretionary, financial services and materials sectors, and disasters 
generally to the consumer discretionary, financial services and materials sectors. Of course, 
such findings only strictly apply to the six disasters specified in this particular analysis, and 
may well vary if other natural, industrial and terrorist events during the sample period were 
included. 
The results indicate that different market sectors respond differently to exogenous 
market shocks in the form of disasters, whether of a natural or human origin. All other things 
being equal, sectors closely associated with claims on insurance policies from the destruction 
of buildings and infrastructure and the disruption to business activity (FIN), those involved in 
the provision of materials for reconstruction (MTL), and those sectors where expenditures are 
most sensitive to changes in consumer confidence (CND) are most sensitive to one or more 
types of disasters. Conversely, sectors dependent upon basic areas of consumption, such as 
consumer staples (CNS), energy (ENG), health care (HLT), telecommunication services (TEL) 
and utilities (UTL) are generally unaffected by these unsystematic shocks. Further, these 
sectors are either internationally non-tradeable or with low levels of international trade and so 
the disruption associated with these disasters are less likely to be associated with export 
substitution or import replacement. By the same token, the financial services industry has 
shown itself to be highly sensitive to changes in global macroeconomic conditions, even to 
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events such as the September 11 terrorist attacks where the direct impact on the domestic 
economy are not immediately apparent. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This study presents an analysis of the impact of natural, industrial and terrorist disasters on 
the Australian capital market. The data employed consists of daily returns in ten market 
sectors: namely, consumer discretionary, consumer staples, energy, financial, health care, 
industrial, information technology, materials, telecommunication services and utilities. 
Intervention (or impact) analysis based an autoregressive moving average (ARMA) models 
augmented with dummy variables are used to evaluate the effect of these extraordinary or 
abnormal events. The most important result of this study is that the shocks provided by 
natural events and disasters have an influence on market sector returns, depending upon the 
sector in question. All other things being equal, the sectors most sensitive to disasters of any 
type are the consumer discretionary, financial services and materials sectors while the most 
significant single event during the past eight years would appear to be the September 11 
terrorist attack, at least in terms of its impact upon the capital market. The apparent sensitivity 
of the financial services sector in this regard is particularly important given that its ability to 
withstand and absorb exogenous shocks takes a sequential role in stabilising the financial 
system, the capital market and the economy as a whole. 
           Of course, there are a number of limitations in this analysis, all of which suggest future 
avenues for research. One possibility is that the focus on sectors in this study ignores the fact 
that at least some disaster impacts may be felt more keenly at the industry level. One obvious 
example is that a diversification effect may reduce the direct impact via property-liability 
insurance from including general (non-life) insurance with deposit-taking institutions (such as 
banks, building societies and credit unions) and other contractual savings institutions 
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(including superannuation funds and life offices) in the category of financial services. Another 
possibility is that even an analysis at the industry level may obscure reactions to disasters at 
the company level. For example, it is posited that the impact of hurricanes on US property-
liability insurers consisted of both a direct ‘market effect’ and an indirect ‘contagion effect’ 
depending upon exposure to claims in the disaster-affected region [see, for instance, Lamb 
(1995), Angbazo and Narayanan (1996) and Cagle (1996)]. Future work in this area could 
then pay more attention to differences across companies including product and factor market 
location, concentration, diversification, orientation and focus. 
 18
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TABLE 1. Summary statistics of Australian equity sector returns 
 CND CNS ENG FIN HLT IND INF MTL TEL UTL 
Observations 2215 2215 2215 2215 2215 2215 803 2215 1456 1845 
Mean 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 
Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Maximum 0.2002 0.0857 0.0924 0.0468 0.1609 0.0904 2.5246 0.0619 0.0833 0.0727 
Minimum -0.1306 -0.0718 -0.0872 -0.0559 -0.0975 -0.0976 -0.3339 -0.0620 -0.0986 -0.0847 
Standard deviation 0.0200 0.0107 0.0140 0.0095 0.0153 0.0105 0.0986 0.0116 0.0156 0.0141 
Skewness 0.3981 0.0598 -0.0119 -0.3369 0.7183 -0.3409 20.8943 0.0694 -0.0676 -0.0552 
Kurtosis 10.4551 7.2198 5.4877 5.3515 12.8866 10.7892 537.3205 4.5074 5.6185 5.9370 
Jarque-Bera statistic 5.19E+03 1.64E+03 5.71E+02 5.52E+02 9.21E+03 5.64E+03 9.61E+06 2.11E+02 4.17E+02 6.64E+02 
JP p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ADF Constant only -46.1967 -45.6867 -44.5064 -43.9009 -45.2404 -47.0810 -28.7125 -42.4657 -36.8058 -39.0648 
ADF Constant and trend -46.2166 -45.6872 -44.5023 -43.9284 -45.2463 -47.1027 -28.7938 -42.4601 -36.9379 -39.1027 
KPSS Constant only 0.2200 0.0915 0.0824 0.2289 0.3040 0.2526 0.3750 0.0829 0.7027 0.3293 
KPSS Constant and trend 0.0558 0.0494 0.0551 0.0290 0.2463 0.0555 0.1262 0.0438 0.1329 0.0993 
Notes: This table presents measures of central tendency, dispersion, shape and the time series properties of returns in the following equity 
sectors: consumer discretionary (CND), consumer staples (CNS), energy (ENG), financial services (FIN), health care (HLT), industrial (IND), 
information technology (INF), material (MTL), telecommunication services (TEL) and utilities (UTL). The sample period ends on 30 June 
2003 for all series with CND, CNS, ENG, FIN, HLT, IND and MTL starting on 27 January 1995, UTL on 6 May 1996, TEL on 1 December 
1997 and INF on 1 June 2000. The critical values of significance for skewness and kurtosis at the .05 levels are 0.1020 and 0.2040 (CND, 
CNS, ENG, FIN, HLT, IND, MTL), 0.1117 and 0.2235 (UTL), 0.1258 and 0.2516 (TEL) and 0.1694 and 0.3388 (INF) respectively. JB – 
Jarque-Bera. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test hypotheses are H0: unit root, H1: no unit root (stationary). The lag orders in the ADF 
equations are determined by the significance of the coefficient for the lagged terms. ADF critical values are -3.1278, -3.4118 and -3.9622 at the 
.10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively. KPSS critical values for constant and trend (constant only) are: 0.7390 (0.1190), 0.4630 (0.1460) and 
0.3470 (0.2160) at the .10, .05 and .01 levels, respectively.   
 
 
 
TABLE 2. Estimated equations for Australian equity sector returns 
 Coefficient Std. error p-value Coefficient Std. error p-value Coefficient Std. error p-value Coefficient Std. error p-value Coefficient Std. error p-value 
  CND   CNS   ENG   FIN   HLT  
μ0 0.0004 0.0004 0.3108 0.0003 0.0002 0.2720 0.0003 0.0003 0.3097 0.0005 0.0002 0.0096 0.0002 0.0003 0.4273 
β1 -0.0101 0.0075 0.1781 -0.0029 0.0056 0.6021 0.0112 0.0071 0.1154 -0.0002 0.0036 0.9549 -0.0046 0.0073 0.5253 
β2 -0.0112 0.0072 0.1237 -0.0006 0.0027 0.8159 -0.0047 0.0071 0.5087 -0.0050 0.0034 0.1381 -0.0076 0.0073 0.2953 
β3 -0.0196 0.0157 0.2125 0.0009 0.0048 0.8566 0.0037 0.0071 0.6024 -0.0162 0.0048 0.0008 -0.0016 0.0073 0.8245 
β4 -0.0016 0.0108 0.8845 -0.0014 0.0022 0.5114 -0.0031 0.0071 0.6577 -0.0105 0.0052 0.0444 -0.0054 0.0073 0.4559 
β 5 -0.0327 0.0243 0.1788 -0.0047 0.0100 0.6406 -0.0075 0.0071 0.2881 -0.0237 0.0108 0.0287 -0.0113 0.0073 0.1210 
β6 -0.0188 0.0054 0.0005 -0.0038 0.0023 0.1031 -0.0032 0.0071 0.6484 0.0078 0.0056 0.1674 0.0049 0.0073 0.4990 
ρ1 -0.2529 0.0240 0.0000 -1.1959 0.0689 0.0000 0.3443 0.0953 0.0003 -0.4848 0.0826 0.0000 -0.7512 0.0804 0.0000 
ρ2 -0.7944 0.0362 0.0000 -0.6315 0.0635 0.0000 -0.6174 0.1062 0.0000 -0.4202 0.0881 0.0000 0.7067 0.0464 0.0000 
ρ3 0.1096 0.0250 0.0000 0.2845 0.0661 0.0000 -0.0303 0.0185 0.1023 -0.8584 0.0738 0.0000 -0.4556 0.0940 0.0000 
ρ4 0.2001 0.0145 0.0000 0.2936 0.0643 0.0000 -0.6221 0.0558 0.0000 – – – -0.2903 0.0550 0.0000 
ρ5 – – – -0.3827 0.0465 0.0000 -0.4455 0.1523 0.0035 – – – – – – 
φ – – – 0.0717 0.0301 0.0173 -0.0486 0.0279 0.0814 -0.0505 0.0269 0.0604 -0.0448 0.0239 0.0614 
θ1 0.2247 0.0241 0.0000 1.2173 0.0665 0.0000 -0.2922 0.0908 0.0013 0.4815 0.0888 0.0000 0.7946 0.0773 0.0000 
θ2 0.7758 0.0368 0.0000 0.6386 0.0599 0.0000 0.6031 0.1054 0.0000 0.3997 0.0946 0.0000 -0.8052 0.0478 0.0000 
θ3 -0.0984 0.0298 0.0010 -0.3550 0.0612 0.0000 0.6630 0.0559 0.0000 0.8423 0.0797 0.0000 -0.0791 0.0240 0.0010 
θ4 -0.2223 0.0194 0.0000 -0.3619 0.0602 0.0000 0.5059 0.1530 0.0010 – – – 0.5043 0.0892 0.0000 
θ5 – – – 0.3807 0.0398 0.0000 – – – – – – 0.3200 0.0542 0.0000 
AIC -5.0050 – – -6.2377 – – -5.7036 – – -6.4851 – – -5.5349 – – 
SC -4.9662 – – -6.1911 – – -5.6596 – – -6.4489 – – -5.4909 – – 
DW 2.0042 – – 1.9671 – – 2.0097 – – 1.8992 – – 1.9975 – – 
LR 5532.9680 – 0.0000 2.8039 – 0.0001 2.9474 – 0.0001 4.7865 – 0.0000 3.9109 – 0.0000 
White 1.6238 – 0.0784 1.8422 – 0.0370 0.9174 – 0.5284 5.0816 – 0.0000 0.2911 – 0.9909 
Q 31.5270 – 0.2940 47.2900 – 0.0050 25.3200 – 0.5010 39.0980 – 0.1000 18.1720 – 0.8690 
LM 1.2014 – 0.3059 1.2147 – 0.2995 0.4418 – 0.8195 1.4983 – 0.1871 0.0587 – 0.9978 
  IND   INF   MTL   TEL   UTL  
μ0 0.0002 0.0002 0.3247 0.0002 0.0037 0.9637 0.0001 0.0002 0.7156 -0.0004 0.0003 0.1977 0.0004 0.0003 0.2717 
β1 0.0036 0.0053 0.5022 – – – 0.0232 0.0138 0.0926 -0.0052 0.0085 0.5402 0.0011 0.0076 0.8875 
β2 -0.0025 0.0053 0.6404 -0.0002 0.0508 0.9962 -0.0070 0.0040 0.0799 -0.0033 0.0029 0.2578 -0.0002 0.0076 0.9756 
β3 -0.0001 0.0053 0.9797 – – – -0.0046 0.0064 0.4753 0.0051 0.0160 0.7486 0.0017 0.0076 0.8204 
β4 0.0005 0.0053 0.9278 -0.0310 0.0508 0.5423 -0.0013 0.0076 0.8601 -0.0022 0.0073 0.7659 -0.0061 0.0076 0.4176 
β 5 -0.0100 0.0053 0.0594 -0.0442 0.0508 0.3847 -0.0184 0.0103 0.0736 0.0095 0.0151 0.5323 0.0063 0.0076 0.4077 
β6 0.0029 0.0053 0.5854 -0.0002 0.0508 0.9962 0.0084 0.0059 0.1495 -0.0024 0.0020 0.2300 -0.0051 0.0076 0.4990 
ρ1 -0.3302 0.0561 0.0000 0.7983 0.3352 0.0175 -0.2666 0.1140 0.0194 -0.2487 0.0497 0.0000 0.0908 0.0233 0.0001 
ρ2 0.3636 0.0244 0.0000 – – – -0.0362 0.0195 0.0629 0.0908 0.0515 0.0778 – – – 
ρ3 0.6080 0.0543 0.0000 – – – -0.4673 0.1107 0.0000 0.2555 0.0419 0.0000 – – – 
ρ4 – – – – – – – – – 0.0847 0.0447 0.0581 – – – 
ρ5 – – – – – – – – – 0.7486 0.0477 0.0000 – – – 
φ – – – – – – -0.0491 0.0252 0.0516 – – – – – – 
θ1 0.3195 0.0569 0.0000 -0.7982 0.3355 0.0176 0.3529 0.1083 0.0011 0.0300 0.0166 0.0712 -0.0560 0.0234 0.0168 
θ2 -0.3608 0.0253 0.0000 – – – 0.4774 0.1047 0.0000 0.2232 0.0432 0.0000 – – – 
θ3 -0.6104 0.0554 0.0000 – – – – – – -0.0941 0.0458 0.0401 – – – 
θ4 – – – – – – – – – -0.2377 0.0366 0.0000 – – – 
θ5 – – – – – – – – – -0.0734 0.0402 0.0678 – – – 
AIC -6.2786 – – -1.7766 – – -6.0968 – – -5.5052 – – -5.6873 – – 
SC -6.2451 – – -1.7355 – – -6.0631 – – -5.4396 – – -5.6604 – – 
DW 1.9786 –  2.0327 –  1.9865 –  1.9916 –  1.9937 – – 
LR 1.5286 – 0.1066 0.3705 – 0.8979 5.4517 – 0.0000 3.7777 – 0.0000 2.9839 – 0.0025 
White 1.0456 – 0.4034 0.0061 – 0.9999 11.0120 – 0.0000 2.7020 – 0.0013 0.9642 – 0.4812 
Q 37.2450 – 0.1700 3.7667 – 0.9999 18.7840 – 0.9440 32.5910 – 0.1420 17.1760 – 0.9930 
LM 1.2845 – 0.2677 0.0795 – 0.9954 1.1375 – 0.3382 1.3594 – 0.2369 0.7492 – 0.5866 
Notes: This table presents estimated coefficients, standard errors and p-values for the ARMA models. Dependent variables are returns for the consumer discretionary (CND), consumer staples 
(CNS), energy (ENG), financial services (FIN), health care (HLT), industrial (IND), information technology (INF), materials (MTL), telecommunication services (TEL) and utilities (UTL) 
sectors. Disaster equation terms are denoted βi where i = 1 (Sydney hail storm), 2 (Canberra bushfire), 3 (Victorian gas supply crisis), 4 (HIH collapse), 5 (September 11) and 6 (Bali bombing); μ0  
is the equation constant;  ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ4, ρ5 are autoregressive terms and θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4,  θ5, θ6 moving average terms where the optimal number (number of lags in brackets) and length of lags vary by 
sector, such that CND = 6,7,8 and 10 (4), CNS (5) = 1,2,6,7 and 9, ENG (5) = 1,2,5,8 and 10, FIN (3) = 3,6 and 9, HLT (3) = 3,6 and 10, IND (3) = 1,3 and 10, INF (1) = 5, MTL (3) = 1,5 and 8, 
TEL (5) = 2,3,8,9 and 10 and UTL (1) = 1; φ is the seasonal lag term where the optimal lag length (where applicable) is CNS = 9, ENG = 5, FIN = 4, HLT = 4, MTL = 10. AIC – Akaike 
Information Criterion, SC - Schwartz Criterion, DW – Durbin-Watson statistic, LR –Likelihood ratio F-statistic and p-value, White – White’s F-statistic and p-value, Q - Ljung-Box Q-statistic 
(l=36), LM - Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test statistic (l=5). Conventional standard errors and p-values for ENG, HLT, IND, INF, and UTL,White’s heteroskedastic consistent standard 
errors and p-values for CND, CNS, FIN, MTL and TEL . 
 Coefficient Std. error p-value Coefficient Std. error p-value Coefficient Std. error p-value Coefficient Std. error p-value Coefficient Std. error p-value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3. Joint hypothesis tests for estimated disaster coefficients 
 Natural disasters Industrial disasters Terrorist disasters All disasters 
 F-statistic p-value F-statistic p-value F-statistic p-value F-statistic p-value 
CND 2.0830 0.1248 0.7877 0.4550 6.9771 0.0010 3.2618 0.0034 
CNS 0.1622 0.8503 0.2329 0.7923 1.4373 0.2378 0.6002 0.7304 
ENG 1.4622 0.2320 0.2347 0.7909 0.6671 0.5133 0.7868 0.5802 
FIN 1.1013 0.3326 7.6253 0.0005 3.3554 0.0351 4.0217 0.0005 
HLT 0.7470 0.4739 0.3021 0.7393 1.4357 0.2382 0.8240 0.5512 
IND 0.3356 0.7150 0.0044 0.9956 1.9317 0.1451 0.7577 0.6033 
INF 3.2380 0.0398 2.8301 0.0596 0.1858 0.8305 1.1442 0.3346 
MTL 2.9622 0.0519 0.2700 0.7634 2.6472 0.0711 1.9589 0.0682 
TEL 0.8220 0.4398 0.0953 0.9092 0.9223 0.3978 0.5450 0.7742 
UTL 0.0105 0.9896 0.3552 0.7011 0.5742 0.5632 0.3137 0.9301 
Notes: This table presents joint hypothesis tests for the estimated disaster coefficients in 
Table 2. Consumer Discretionary (CND), Consumer Staples (CNS), Energy (ENG), Financial 
(FIN), Health Care (HLT), Industrial (IND), Information Technology (INF), Material (MTL), 
Telecommunication Services (TEL), Utilities (UTL). Natural disasters include Sydney 
hailstorm and Canberra bushfire, industrial disasters include Victorian gas supply crisis 
and HIH collapse, terrorist disasters include September 11 and Bali bombing, All 
disasters include natural, industrial and terrorist disasters.  
 
 
 
 
 
